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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
LAUNCH ESCAPE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM 
By Neil A. Townsend 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The Apollo launch escape propulsion subsystem contained three solid-propellant 
rocket motors:  the launch-escape motor, the tower-jettison motor, and the pitch- 
control motor. The launch-escape motor, the main motor in the launch escape system, 
had a thrust  of 155 000 pounds and was capable of moving the command module away 
from and out of the path of the remaining portions of the launch vehicle if  a launch- 
vehicle malfunction occurred and an abort w a s  required. The tower-jettison-motor 
function was to separate the launch escape system from the command module before 
deployment of the command module parachutes if an abort occurred. The tower- 
jettison motor also was used to remove the launch escape system away from and out 
of the path of a normally functioning launch vehicle. The pitch-control motor w a s  
essential  to establish a safe trajectory of the activated launch escape system. The 
design, qualification, and testing of the launch escape system components were com- 
pleted during the yea r s  1961 to 1966 and were remarkably free of failures. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo launch escape system (LES) was designed to provide a positive means 
of crew escape if booster failure occurred during the initial phase of launch. The 
system had to achieve sufficient altitude for deployment of the command module (CM) 
parachutes and to ensure safe lateral separation. Lateral  separation was achieved by 
firing simultaneously the pitch-control motor and the launch-escape motor for low- 
altitude aborts. The pitch-control motor w a s  not required fo r  high-altitude aborts. 
The system is no longer required after second-stage ignition and is jettisoned after 
verification of ignition. 
The purpose of this report  is to identify those problems that were encountered 
in  the LES propulsion components program. Where possible, an explanation is made 
of how these problems might be avoided in any future program. 
A 0 - b a l l  assembly 
#. 
COMPONENT CONFl GURATl ON 
The pitch-control motor, the tower- 
jettison motor, and the launch-escape 
motor constituted the propulsion compo- 
nents of the LES, and these motors pro- 
vided trajectory shaping, LES-jettison 
capability, and primary propulsion, re- 
spectively. Also, the LES (fig. 1) included 
the Q-ball assembly, the launch-escape 
tower canard system, the structural  skirt,  
the tower structure, the tower and CM 
separation system, the forward-heat- 
shield separation and retention system, 
and the boost protective cover.. Selected 
design characteristics of the LES motors 
are given in table I. 
Item 
1 Bal last  compar tment  Canard-suppor t  
s t r u c t u r e  
rdc P i t c h - c o n t r o l  
LES 
I 
31 ft 11 ir 
I 
Tower - je t t i son  motor  
4 ' t o w e r - j e t t i s o n  mo 
t h r u s t - v e c t o r  ang le  
1 .  
I 1 t h r u s t - v e c t o r  ang le  
motor  
I n t e r s t a g e  s t r u c t u r e  
\Launch-escape  motor  - S t r u c t u r a l  s k i r t  I b 
\ 
l o w e r  s t r u c t u r e  
Forward-heat -sh ie ld -  
separation system 
l o w e r  leg (separated by 
exploding bolt sys tems)  
Figure 1. - Apollo launch escape system. 
TABLE I. - SELECTED DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF LES MOTORS 
Weight, lb  
Length, in. 
Diameter, in. 
Thrust level a t  sea-level 
pressure, lb 
Thrust-rise time from appli- 
cation of firing current to 
reach 90 percent of maxi- 
mum, msec 
pressure, lb-sec 
Total impulse a t  sea-level 
Satisfactory performance 
after uniform soak temper - 
atures, OF 
Maximum, "F 
Minimum, "F 
Pitch-control motor 
51 
22.00 
10.51 
54000 
.___~- 
60 to 120 (to reach 
80 percent of 
maximum) 
1750 (70" F) (t3 per- 
cent)c 
140 
20 
Tower -jettison motor 
535 
55.62 
28.00 
31 200 to 36 000 (140" F)' 
~~ 
(average thrust) 
29 400 to 33 900 (70" F) 
28 000 to 32 400 (20" F) 
75 to 150 
(average thrust) 
(average thrust) 
35 900 to 37 700 (140" F) 
35 800 to 37 600 (70" F) 
35 700 to 37 500 (20" F) 
140 
20 
Launch-escape motor 
4850 
185.57 
53.66 
5200 000 (120" F) 
(maximum vacuum 
thrust) 
bz147 000 (70" F) 
2121 000 (20' F) 
(minimum thrust) 
50 to 120 
515 000 (70" F) 
(minimum) d 
120 
20 
aTemperatures in parentheses a r e  propellant-grain temperatures. 
bAverage thrust between 0.12 and 2.0 seconds a t  a pressure altitude of 36 000 feet. 
'Capability after modification from 1550 to 3000 lb-sec. 
dMinimum delivered total impulse between 0.12 and 2.0 seconds + 233 064 lb-sec. 
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P itch -Control Motor 
The combustion chamber was the major structure of the pitch-control motor 
(fig. 2). The outside wall of the combustion chamber had provisions for  mounting the 
motor horizontally within the canard-support enclosure. The combustion chamber had 
three basic pa r t s :  a cylinder, a forward closure-dome assembly, and an aft closure- 
dome assembly. 
Figure 2. - Pitch-control motor. 
The solid-propellant grain of the pitch-control motor was  of a 14-point internal- 
burning star configuration. The solid-propellant grain (approximately 8 .9  pounds) was 
cast  directly against the combustion chamber liners. In the original LES mission re- 
quirements, it w a s  specified that the pitch-control motor must be suitable for  modifi- 
cation so  that a total impulse of 1550 t o  3000 pound-seconds could be provided without 
major redesign, redevelopment, o r  requalification. The pitch-control-motor con- 
t ractor  met th i s  design requirement by varying the propellant-grain length; the addition 
of auxiliary materials such as grain supports o r  inert s l ivers  was  not needed. Ulti- 
mately, in Apollo mission requirements, a total impulse of 1750 pound-seconds was 
prescribed; therefore, the solid-propellant grain length was approximately 8.2 inches. 
The maximum solid-propellant grain length that was used during development was 
approximately 15.9 inches. 
The solid-propellant grain was ignited by means of an igniter assembly that con- 
sisted of a pellet-basket-type igniter, two pressure taps, and two pyrotechnic igniter 
cartridges.  Each pyrotechnic igniter cartridge consisted of a booster charge and an 
Apollo standard initiator (hot-bridgewire-type initiator). The pyrotechnic igniter 
car t r idges of the pitch-control motor were identical to the pyrotechnic igniter car- 
tridges that were used in the launch-escape motor and could be installed at the launch 
pad. 
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Tower-Jettison Motor 
The tower-jettison motor had two major parts:  the combustion chamber and the 
interstage structure (fig. 3).  The combustion chamber and inter stage-structure as- 
sembly were 26 inches in diameter, were 55.6 inches in length, and weighed 
527 pounds. 
55.6 in .  
Combustion- Aft-closure- 
T H e a d - e n d  anachmenl ring /-chamber cylinder 
Figure 3. - Tower-jettison motor. 
The interstage structure,  designed and developed as an integral part  of the tower- 
jettison motor, was used to attach the tower-jettison motor t o  the launch-escape motor. 
The 90.3-pound cylindrical interstage s t ructure  had a diameter of 26 inches and a 
length of 30 inches. 
The two exhaust nozzles of the tower-jettison motor were bolted to the aft closure 
of the combustion chamber (fig. 3). The nozzles were submerged in the combustion 
chamber and extended through the interstage structure wall. 
The solid-propellant grain of the tower-jettison motor was of a 10-point, double- 
web, internal-burning star configuration. This  composite solid-propellant grain, which 
weighed approximately 205 pounds, was cast directly against the chamber l iner (fig. 3). 
The solid-propellant grain did not require  the addition of such auxiliary mater ia l  as 
grain supports or  inert  s l ivers  to meet the design objectives. 
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An igniter assembly was used to ignite the solid-propellant grain of the tower- 
jettison motor. The igniter assembly consisted of the igniter combustion chamber, the 
pressure-take-off port, the pellet-container assembly, and the igniter solid-propellant 
grain. 
The main charge of the igniter assembly, a composite solid-propellant igniter 
grain, consisted of approximately 1 . 8 3  pounds of the same type of propellant that was 
used in the tower-jettison motor. The propellant w a s  cas t  in a liner tube that was 
composed of a paper-base phenolic resin.  The cast grain was inserted in the igniter 
case and was bonded in place. The igniter assembly w a s  ignited by means of redundant 
(tw 0) pyrotechnic igniter cart ridge s . 
Launch-Escape Motor 
The case assembly of the launch-escape motor (fig. 4(a)) was made of heat- 
treated steel  and included a cylindrical mounting flange at the forward end for use in 
mounting the tower-jettison motor (fig. 1). The aft closure dome of the launch-escape 
motor was made of heat-treated high-strength steel and was attached to the case as- 
sembly by means of a bolted flange. The dome contained provisions for attachment 
of the four fixed-exhaust nozzles, fo r  mounting of the motor-case assembly, and 
for mating of the dome with the structural  skirt.  
Four exhaust nozzles were secured to the aft closure dome. Off-sizing of the 
respective exhaust-nozzle throat diameters, as was done on the tower-jettison motor 
exhaust nozzles, provided the means for  effective thrust-vector deflection from the 
. 
mean geometric motor centerline. 
The solid-propellant grain of the 
launch-escape motor had an eight-point, 
internal-burning star configuration. The 
motor was ignited by means of an igniter 
assembly (fig. 4(b)). The igniter assembly 
was mounted on the forward end of the 
motor-case assembly and was concentric 
with the motor centerline. The igniter as- 
sembly contained a booster charge propel- 
lant charge and a main propellant charge. 
The booster charge was composed of boron 
and potassium nitrate;  the main propellant 
charge was of the same type as the launch- 
escape motor propellant. 
--- 
I 
4- igniter 1-wire 
cartridge 
(a) Motor. 
Figure 4. - bunch-escape  motor. 
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Inner  post 
(fiber g l a s s 1 7  
0 50 in (was 0.310 in.)  El-! I- 
Propellant 
Rod (0.435-in. diameter) 
grain A 
Potting Nozzle 
lone-piece. 
phenolic1 
(b) Igniter. 
Figure 4. - Concluded. 
OPERATING MODES 
Normal Launch 
L A  
During a normal launch, jettison of the LES (fig. 1) was initiated manually. 
Normally, the tower-leg explosive bolts and the tower-jettison motor were ignited 
simultaneously. The LES and the boost protective cover were pulled out of the path of 
the oncoming launch vehicle. The lateral-separation maneuver ensured a minimum 
m i s s  distance of 150 feet. For  worst-case conditions, the LES could separate and 
avoid recontact with the launch vehicle. If the tower-jettison motor malfunctioned, the 
launch-escape motor could be used fo r  the LES jettison without impairing the safety of 
the crewmen. 
Abort C apabi I it i e s 
The six types of abort capabilities that were considered necessary f o r  the LES 
were as follows. 
Pad escape. - For  an abort  just before o r  shortly after lift-off, the LES would 
have separated the CM from the service module (SM) and the launch vehicle. The CM 
would have been propelled to an adequate height fo r  proper operation of the CM earth 
landing system. Sufficient range would be obtained to  minimize wind-drift problems. 
The abort-trajectory plane was fixed nominally in a down-range direction. The 
minimum-altitude requirement f o r  pad aborts  was 3000 feet at apogee. 
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Low -altitude abort. - The LES was capable of separating the CM from a thrusting 
launch vehicle at altitudes at which range -safety considerations prohibited termination 
of launch-vehicle booster-engine thrust;  that is, until approximately 40 seconds after 
lift-off. 
Abort a t  high dynamic pressure.  - The LES had the capability to function at the 
maximum dynamic pressure that was expected during launch. The abort would be 
initiated before structural  breakup of the launch vehicle. 
Abort below 100 000 feet altitude. - Transition altitude was approximately 
100 000 feet. An abort could be initiated either manually o r  automatically by means 
of a n  electrical  signal that originated from the launch-vehicle emergency detection 
syste'm. If an abort  signal occurred, the launch-escape motor, pitch-control motor, 
and CM-to-SM tension-tie pyrotechnics would be ignited simultaneously. The pitch- 
control motor and the launch-escape motor would provide thrust  for approximately 
0.6 and 4.0 seconds, respectively. The pitch-control motor could produce a large 
pitching moment of relatively short duratisn. The large pitching moment would in- 
crease the range capability for  pad aborts and would increase lateral separation from 
the flightpath of the launch vehicle- for aborts at higher altitudes. At 42 seconds after 
lift-off, the pitch-control motor would be deactivated, either automatically by a t imer-  
controlled relay o r  manually by a crewman-operated switch. 
Subsequent to  an 11.0-second delay after abort initiation, the canards would be 
deployed to reorientate the LES and the CM in the heat-shield-forward attitude. Then, 
after a 3.0-second delay, o r  after descent to an altitude of 25 000 feet, the LES and the 
docking mechanism would be jettisoned by means of simultaneous ignition of the tower- 
jettison motor, the LES tower-leg explosive bolts, and the docking-mechanism pyro- 
technics. The boost protective cover, which is attached to the LES tower structure, 
would be jettisoned with the LES. 
Abort above transition altitude. - At altitudes greater  than 100 000 feet, the crew- 
men would use the reaction control system of the CM t o  provide a positive pitching 
moment for the LES and CM. The canards would be deployed 11 seconds after abort 
initiation, and subsequent events would be similar to those described in the preceding 
paragraph . 
Maximum abort altitude. - The maximum altitude for a n  LES abort was compatible 
with the completion of launch-vehicle second-stage ignition, with the separation of 
jettisoned components, with the achievement of a launch-vehicle dynamic pressure,  and 
with the resulting low drag that facilitated the use of the SM propulsion system. The 
parameters  that were established as maximal for the operation of the LES were an alti- 
tude of 320 000 feet, a Mach number of 8.0, and a dynamic pressure of 0 . 5  to  
1.0 lb/ft . 2 
GROUND-BASED TEST PROGRAM 
The LES qualification-test program consisted of environmental testing and static 
test firing of LES pitch-control, tower-jettison, and launch-escape motors. The static 
7 
test firings consisted of firing the LES solid-propellant test motors after the propel- 
lants had been stabilized at selected temperatures.  All static test firings were accom- 
plished with motors that had prefire solid-propellant temperatures of 20", 70", o r  
120" F. These temperatures represented minimum, nominal, and maximum expected 
motor temperatures. All LES solid-propellant motors were static test fired at a nom- 
inal pressure of 14.7 psia. 
Pitch -Co n t ro l  Motor Qual i f i  cation -Test P rogr am 
Environmental testing was conducted on 14 pitch-control motors. The pitch- 
control motors were divided into five test groups: (1) temperature cycling and vibration 
testing, (2) temperature cycling and drop testing, (3) accelerated aging, (4) accelera- 
tion testing, and (5) temperature-cycle testing. Static test firings were conducted on 
17  pitch-control motors, including 10 motors that were used previously in the environ- 
mental testing. The pitch-control motors were divided into three groups based on pre- 
fire solid-propellant temperatures of 20" F (six motors), 70" F (four motors), and 
120 " F (seven motors). 
During the qualification phase of testing, the pitch-control motor met all environ- 
mental and structural-integrity test requirements. Also, the motor met all 
performance-specification requirements except those for  thrust-rise time. Specifi- 
cation requirements for  thrust-rise time were a minimum of 0.060 second and a maxi- 
mum of 0.110 second. One motor that had a thrust-rise time of 0.117 second was 
static test fired to  simulate a failure mode (simulating a nozzle-closure failure). This 
thrust-rise time was within the specification requirements fo r  the launch-escape motor 
(a minimum of 0.050 second and a maximum of 0.120 second), thus the deviation was  
acceptable because the pitch-control motor was ignited concurrently with the launch- 
escape motor. The pitch-control motor specification was changed to  agree with the 
thrust-rise time of the launch-escape motor. 
Tower-Jetti son Motor Qual i  fication-Test Program 
The static-test-firing phase of the qualification-test program was conducted on 
21  tower-jettison motors, including 15 motors that were tested environmentally. The 
motors were divided into four test groups: (1) temperature cycling, (2) accelerated 
aging, (3) temperature cycling and impact testing, and (4) vibration testing, tempera- 
t u re  cycling, and impact testing. The tower-jettison motors were divided into three 
groups based on prefire solid-propellant temperatures of 20" F (nine motors), 70" F 
(five motors), and 120" F (seven motors). 
It was noted in tower-jettison-motor specifications that certain performance 
parameters must be within specific tolerances at the prefire propellant temperatures 
of 20", 70", and 120" F; however, because of conditioning problems, the static-test- 
firing data were obtained at somewhat different prefire propellant temperatures.  
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Launch-Escape Motor Qual i fication-Test Program 
The qualification-test program consisted of static firing t e s t s  of 20 launch-escape 
motors.  Four types of t e s t s  were involved; these tests included firing (seven motors), 
accelerated aging (two motors), temperature cycling (four motors), and sequential 
tests (seven motors). The sequential t e s t s  consisted of firing seven launch-escape 
motors  that were  subjected to  a specific sequence of environments. Six motors were 
each subjected successively to a temperature-cycle test ,  a drop test, and a firing test. 
One motor was subjected successively to a vibration test, a temperature-cycle test, 
and a firing test .  
All launch-escape-motor specifications that concerned ballistic performance, 
environmental testing, and thrust alinement (except for roll-moment testing) were met. 
The test  data  indicated that the maximum roll  l imi t  of 130 foot-pounds was exceeded fo r  
five motors;  however, an optical check of the nozzles indicated that the maximum mis- 
alinement would result  in a maximum roll  of no more than 4 foot-pounds. The high 
rol l  moments were attributed to test stand load cell measurement e r r o r s  rather than 
to  a design deficiency. 
Pitch-Control Motor Quali f icat ion and Production Problems 
The maximum combustion-chamber pressure and the maximum thrust  of a quali- 
fication static-test-fired pitch-control motor were abnormally high for the 20" F 
prefire -conditioning temperature of the motor. Although the test results indicated that 
the pitch-control motor had met all specification requirements, an investigation was 
conducted to  determine the cause of the anomaly. 
Postfire inspection of the expended hardware revealed that there  were two hot 
spots in the combustion chamber at the forward girth weld. Further inspection of the 
combustion-chamber interior resulted in evidence of premature solid-propellant burn- 
out in these areas. A review of the processing and tes t  records  indicated that, after 
radiographic inspection of the motor, a nonconformance report  was written t o  document 
two solid-propellant cracks.  One crack was located midway between the girth weld on 
the aft end of the combustion chamber, and the other c rack  was located at the forward 
girth weld approximately two webs from the a r e a  where the hot spots were noted. The 
Material  Review Board decision, based on experience with defects such as these during 
the development program, was to accept the pitch-control motor without repair .  In the 
opinion of the Material  Review Board, these defects (solid-propellant c racks)  would not 
affect ballistic performance materially, whereas repa i r  would necessitate extensive 
solid-propellant removal. Based on the results of the investigation, the defects at the 
girth weld propagated along the weld; thus, a large a r e a  of solid-propellant unbond w a s  
produced during static test firing. The corrective action to  prevent a recurrence of 
this  anomaly was to repair  all solid-propellant cracks before shipment. 
During the drop test of a pitch-control motor that was being subjected to tempera- 
tu re  cycling and drop testing before static firing, another failure occurred. The drop 
test was planned to demonstrate that the motor could be handled safely. The pitch- 
control-motor solid propellant was temperature cycled by means of successive stabili- 
zation at -20", 140", -20", 140", and -20" F. At the final -20" F condition, the 
pitch-control motor was positioned with the longitudinal axis vertical and the nozzle 
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end down and was dropped 4 feet onto reinforced concrete. By inspection of the nozzle 
hull, it was noted that the graphite inser t  had moved forward approximately 0.030 inch, 
breaking the sealant at the graphite-hull upstream interface. This failure caused 
excessive leakage during the postassembly pressure check, and the motor was rejected 
f o r  static test firing in accordance with existing qualification plans; therefore, the drop 
test was considered to be successful because no safety hazard existed after the motor 
was dropped. 
Tower-Jettison Motor Quali f icat ion and Production Problems 
During static test firing, the thrust-rise t imes of two tower-jettison motors 
exceeded the specification. The static test performance of these motors was normal 
except for a long ignition delay time, which resulted in a prolonged thrust-rise time 
and total burn time. The cause of these unusually long ignition-delay t imes was traced 
to  low input current  being applied to the initiator bridgewires. The low input current  
was  caused by an improperly used firing harness (ground-support equipment) that con- 
nects  the igniter cartridges to the ignition circuit (ground-support equipment). A firing 
current  of 5 amperes  should have been applied to each of two bridgewires that were 
attached to  each initiator. Instead, the improperly used firing harness  resulted in the 
application of approximately 2.5 amperes  of firing current to each of two bridgewires 
that were attached to each initiator. The motor manufacturer did not have adequate 
definition of current  application requirements to design the wiring harness  properly. 
Clarified instructions were provided and the low-amperage condition was corrected for  
all subsequent testing by making two special firing harnesses.  One of these special 
firing harnesses was used for static test  firings of tower-jettison motors that were 
assigned t o  ignition test categories 1 and 3; that is, both ignition categories necessi- 
tated duplication of a failed igniter cartridge. The other special firing harness  was 
used for static test firings of tower-jettison motors that were assigned to  ignition test 
categories 2 and 4; that is, both of these ignition categories necessitated normal igni- 
tion conditions. The failures of the two tower-jettison motors were a direct  result  of 
improperly used ground-support equipment ra ther  than the resul t  of a tower-jettison 
motor malfunction, and the resul ts  were deleted from the performance evaluations. 
The thrust-rise time that was obtained from another tower-jettison motor during 
static test firing exceeded the specification. The static test firing performance of this 
motor was normal except fo r  an unusually long igniter ignition-delay t ime, which 
resulted in prolonged motor ignition-delay, thrust-rise,  and total t imes.  A thorough 
check of the electrical  and instrumentation systems led to the conclusion that the proper 
fir ing current, igniter -cartridge resistances,  and igniter harness  were used. The 
precise cause of this failure could not be determined from the available information. 
However, possible factors that could have contributed to  the malfunction were inert  
deb r i s  from the igniter cartridge, relatively small-diameter flame ports in the igniter 
case, premature expulsion of the booster powder charge from the igniter cartridge,  
and deflection of the igniter-cartridge flame by the igniter-cartridge closures  into the 
heat-sink a r e a  of the igniter case.  
Corrective action to prevent future igniter failures of the types discussed included 
modification of the igniter assembly to  permit a greater  tolerance for the debris  asso-  
ciated with the igniter cartridge. The diameter of the flame ports in the igniter case 
was enlarged from 0.375 to  0.500 inch t o  preclude flame-passage blockage. The 
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two-layer vinyl-tape cover on the boron/potassium nitrate pellet container was reduced 
to  a single-layer-tape cover to permit easier tape burnthrough. This igniter ignition- 
delay malfunction occurred during the time that the tower-jettison motor was duplica- 
ting a double-failure mode (a failed initiator and a failed nozzle closure), and there is 
no requirement for successful demonstration with the tower-jettison motor under these 
conditions. Because the igniter assembly was modified and because a double-failure 
mode was  being duplicated, the test resul ts  of the failed motor were deleted from the 
performance evaluation. F 
After the completion of the tower- jettison motor qualification-test program, an 
igniter-test program was conducted to  verify that the igniter modifications were suc- 
cessful. This  program was completed without any failures.  
Failure of the interstage structure of the third tower-jettison motor that was 
static test fired caused the subsequent destruction of the motor assembly. The failure, 
which originated at the inter stage structure forward and aft attachment rings,  was 
caused by shear failure of the spotwelds that were used to attach the r ings to the inter-  
stage structure.  Because the r ings became detached, the solid-propellant motor pulled 
free from the test stand, impacted on the head-end wall of the test bay, and shattered 
the motor assembly. During postfire inspection, it was noted that the interstage aft 
attachment ring was still bolted to the tes t  stand, and the forward attachment ring had 
remained bolted to  the motor aft closure. By examination of the sheared spotwelds on 
both rings, evidence of inadequate welding was obtained. During subsequent investiga- 
tion of the spotwelding operation, it was ascertained that improper mating of the com- 
ponents to be welded could have been an important factor that had contributed to  the 
inadequate welds. It was discovered also that one welder had rewelded those welds 
that did not pas s  visual inspection. This would have resulted in weld embrittlement 
and failure at lower stress. These factors led to the conclusion that the integrity of 
the spotwelds on all of the remaining interstage s t ructures  was questionable; therefore, 
to  prevent future failures, the spotwelds of all of the remaining interstage s t ructures  
were supplemented with high-shear rivets. Also, a procedure was incorporated to  
proof-load test all interstage structures at 1.15 t imes the design load, and another 
solid-propellant tower-jettison motor was added to  the qualification-test program to 
replace the failed motor. 
To verify the structural  integrity of the redesigned interstage assembly, two 
interstages were subjected to  three cycles of proof loading; then, the two interstages 
were loaded until failure occurred. Failure was considered to be the point at which 
interstage-structure deformation continued without a corresponding load increase.  The 
two interstages failed at pull loads of 2.5 and 2.6 t imes the design loads, respectively. 
These pull loads were greater than the ultimate-load requirement of 1 .5  t imes the de- 
sign load. No rivet o r  spotweld connections failed during the ultimate-load tests. As 
a result  of the successful proof-load and ultimate-load testing, the structural  adequacy 
of the interstage redesign was proven. 
Lau n c  h -E scape Motor Qual i f i  cation and P rod u ct i  o n  P rob1 ems 
Launch-escape motor cases were manufactured in four lots. During the lot 2 
acceptance test, one launch-escape motor case failed at 2300 psig during the seventh 
proof cycle (2400 f 50 psig). This failure was attributed to  a weld defect. This motor 
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case  was being used to verify the adequacy of all the cases  fabricated in lot 2. It had 
been subjected to six proof cycles and the seventh test was to  have proceeded to burst 
pressure  when the failure occurred. The failure investigation concluded that, if  the 
case had been subjected to X-ray inspection before the final test, the weld flaw would 
have been detected. Additionally, the maximum operating pressure  was 1800 psia; 
therefore, the case had shown a safety factor of 1.3. Based on this rationale and be- 
cause all cases  were subjected to X-ray inspection after proof testing, it w a s  con- 
cluded that no corrective action was required. 
During the lot 3 acceptance test, a launch-escape motor case  that was being 
tested failed at 2270 psig during the third proof cycle (2400 * 50 psig). Because of this 
failure, a second motor case was assigned to the lot 3 acceptance tes t  program, and 
this motor case failed at 2250 psig during the third proof cycle (2400 * 50 psig). By 
means of metallurgical examination, it was shown that an unqualified weld wire  was 
used in the manufacture of the lot 3 launch-escape motor cases ;  therefore, all lot 3 
motor cases  were rejected, and quality control procedures were imposed on the sup- 
plier to ensure that this failure would not occur again. 
During production-acceptance static firing of a launch-escape motor, the inner 
fiber-glass solid-propellant grain support of the pyrogen igniter broke loose from its 
retention device and exited through the nozzle, striking and breaking off the nozzle exit 
cone approximately 6 inches from the end. The resu l t s  of an investigation indicated 
that the pressure of the motor ignition caused the phenolic plug in the end of the inner 
fiber-glass solid-propellant grain support to be forced forward, impacting the end of 
the support and expanding; this could have broken the bond between the pyrogen assem- 
bly and the inner fiber-glass solid-propellant grain support (fig. 4(b)). 
A decision was made to redesign the igniter to improve the inner f iber-glass  
solid-propellant grain-support capabilities by making three changes. A tension rod 
was added in the inner fiber-glass solid-propellant grain support to retain the support 
if  a failure occurred. Lateral displacement of the inner fiber-glass solid-propellant 
grain support at the aft end during firing of the launch-escape motor was prevented. 
The total mass  of par t s  was minimized to be consistent with the other two changes. 
To verify the structural  integrity of the improved igniter under operating condi- 
tions, the following test  conditions were used. 
1. Overtests at extreme temperature conditions 
2. Overtests at high igniter-pressure conditions 
3 .  Normal t e s t s  of igniters previously exposed to temperature cycling o r  to 
vibration conditions 
4. Normal t e s t s  of igniters during vibration conditions 
5. Normal t e s t s  of igniters in full-scale launch-escape motors  
6.  Structural tes ts  to fa i lure  (hydroburst tests) of igniter inert components 
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Test-program resu l t s  indicated that the improved-design igniter performed 
satisfactorily under extreme -temperature conditions, high igniter pressures ,  and 
within the specification requirements. A minimum design margin of safety of 1 . 4  w a s  
demonstrated in two structural  tests.  The improved igniter design sustained minor 
erosion of the outer solid-propellant grain support upstream of the junction with the 
igniter nozzle. However, the extent of erosion w a s  so slight that the integrity of the 
igniter was not compromised. 
PAD-ABORT TEST PROGRAM 
The pad-abort tes t  program was designed to provide a means by which the LES 
pad-abort capabilities could be demonstrated. The test  program involved two flights. 
On both flights, the U S  requirements were to propel an unmanned Apollo-type boiler- 
plate spacecraft f rom a launch pad to sufficient height and oriented to the proper atti- 
tude so that the spacecraft ear th  landing system could function properly. 
Apollo Pad Abort 1 Mission 
The Apollo pad abort 1 (PA-1) mission was the first flight test of an Apollo-type 
spacecraft. All  f i rs t -order  test objectives of the Apollo PA-1 mission were satisfied. 
Aerodynamic -stability character is t ics  of the Apollo escape configuration during a pad 
abort were determined. The LES and CM configurations were stable during the flight; 
however, pitch, yaw, and roll  were not as predicted during the powered phase of the 
flight. The capability of the LES to propel a CM to a safe distance from the launch 
vehicle w a s  demonstrated. 
The most significant anomaly of the Apollo PA-1 mission appeared during the 
postflight investigation. It was discovered that launch-escape -motor exhaust particles 
had impinged on the CM and had caused soot deposits. As a result  of this anomaly, a 
boost protective cover for the CM was provided on subsequent vehicles. 
Apollo Pad Abort 2 Mission 
The Apollo pad abort 2 (PA-2) mission, the second pad-abort test, was required 
because of spacecraft-configuration changes that had been made. These changes in- 
cluded changes in mass  characterist ics,  the addition of a canard subsystem, and the 
addition of the CM boost protective cover. All objectives of the test were accomplished 
successfully. The flight sequence of major events for the Apollo PA-2 mission is given 
in figure 5. 
As  planned, the launch-escape motor and the pitch-control motor were ignited 
simultaneously. A moderate positive-roll rate developed at lift-off; this was attributed 
to the aerodynamic asymmetry of the vehicle configuration. The ro l l  rate did not com- 
promise the success  of the mission. The canard surfaces were deployed satisfactorily 
to destabilize the configuration and to turn the configuration to a main-heat-shield- 
forward condition at the time of the drogue-parachute deployment. During the turn- 
around maneuver, the LES and the apex cover were jettisoned successfully. 
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G r o u n d  range I t  
Time f r o m  l i l t - o l l ,  
Event sec 
1. LII I-of1 
2. Canard  deployment 
3 .  l o w e r  je t t ison 
4. C M  apex-cover je t t ison 
5 .  Drogue-parachute  deployment 
6. Drogue-parachute  d isconnect  
7. Pi lo t -parachute  deployment 
8. M a i n  parachutes lul l  open 
9. C M  landing 
0 
10.9 
14.0 
14.4 
16.0 
28.6 
28.6 
45.5 
112.6 
Figure 5. - Major events of Apollo 
PA-2 mission. 
LITTLE JOE TEST PROGRAM 
The Little Joe flight test program 
consisted of five launches of simulated CM 
on Little Joe I1 launch vehicles. The Little 
Joe I1 test program was conducted at the 
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. 
The primary objectives of the Little 
Joe I1 flights were to demonstrate that the 
LES could safely abort the CM under c r i t i -  
cal flight conditions, to verify the integrity 
and reliability of the ear th  landing system 
after an abort, and to confirm the structural  
integrity of the ear th  landing system and the 
CM when exposed to critical abort 
conditions . 
The first flight of a qualification-test 
vehicle was launched on August 28, 1963. 
A series of four Little Joe II launches was 
conducted on boilerplates of prototype Apollo 
spacecraft. The objectives of the Little 
Joe I1 test program are summarized in 
table 11, and the major events are shown in 
figures 6 to  9. 
Each of the abort missions resulted in soft landings of the CM boilerplates; th i s  
included one unscheduled inflight emergency abort  that was caused by a malfunction of 
the launch vehicle control system. Shortly after lift-off on the Apollo A-003 mission, 
the Little Joe 11 launch vehicle began an uncontrolled ro l l  that accelerated as the flight 
velocity increased. Before second-stage ignition and while still at low altitude, the 
Little Joe I1 launch vehicle disintegrated. An unplanned (but successful) low-altitude 
abort was started 26.3 seconds later, and satisfactory ear th  landing occurred approxi- 
mately 4.5 minutes later. Because of the ear ly  breakup of the Little Joe 11 launch vehi- 
cle, the high-altitude-test point (120 000 feet) was  not achieved, but a successful 
low-altitude (12 400 feet) abort from a rapidly rolling (approximately 335"/sec) launch 
vehicle was demonstrated. At the t ime of the abort, the Mach number, the dynamic 
pressure,  and the altitude were close to Saturn IB and Saturn V nominal-launch- 
trajectory conditions. 
The Little Joe I1 test series resulted in  the qualification of the Apollo LES and the 
CM ea r th  landing system for manned missions. If the tests had been manned missions, 
the crewmen would have landed safely. 
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TABLE 11. - LITTLE JOE I1 FLIGHT PROGRAM-OBJECTIVES 
Development 
issues  
Performance 
Integrity 
Procedures 
I Environment 
(a) LES launch -vehicle qualification 
~ 
Ob j e c tives 
Demonstrate capability to perform the launch trajectory for 
Demonstrate ability of launch vehicle to clear the launchera 
Demonstrate Algol thrust  -termination systema 
Demonstrate functional and structural adequacy of ground-support 
~po110 A-001 missiona 
b equipment 
Demonstrate that fins are flutter freea 
Demonstrate structural  integrity for Apollo A-001 missiona 
~ 
Demonstrate adequacy of the procedure for wind compensation by 
a aiming launcher in azimuth and elevation 
Evaluate techniques and procedures which contribute to efficient 
b launch operations 
Evaluate procedures for ground-command abort for application to 
b Apollo A-001 mission 
~~~ ~~ 
Determine base pres  sure  s 
Determine base heating 
Determine flexible body response of total launch vehicle plus payloac 
First-order test objective. a 
bSecond-order tes t  objective. 
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TABLE 11. - LITTLE JOE I1 FLIGHT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES - Continued 
(b) Apollo A-001 mission transonic abort at high dynamic pressure  
~~ 
Abort capability Demonstrate the capability of the LES to propel the CM safely 
a 
away from the launch vehicle 
Stability Determine aerodynamic stability character is t ics  of the escape 
a configuration for this abort  condition 
a 
Structural integrity 
and performance 
Demonstrate the structural  integrity of the escape tower 
Separation Demonstrate satisfactory timing sequence in the ear th  landing 
a 
system 
= 
I LES issues  1 Objectives 
Recovery with ear th  
landing system 
Demonstrate proper operation of the applicable components of 
a the earth landing system 
Effects induced by 
environment 
Demonstrate proper operation of the CM/SM separation 
b 
subsystem 
Determine aerodynamic loads that a r e  caused by local surface 
pressure on the CM and SM during a Little Joe I1 launch b 
~ 
LES issues  
Abort capability 
(c) Apollo A-002 mission abort  at maximum dynamic pressure  
Ob j e c tives 
Demonstrate satisfactory launch escape vehicle (LEV) perform- 
ance by the use of the canard subsystem and boost protective 
cover, and verify the abort capability at maximum dynamic 
pressure  with conditions that approximate the l imits of the 
emergency detection systema 
Determine the performance of the LEV in the maximum- 
b dynamic -pressure region 
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TABLE II. - LITTLE JOE 11 FLIGHT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES - Continued 
(c) Apollo A-002 mission abort  at maximum dynamic pressure  - Concluded 
LES issues  
Stability 
Structural integrity 
and performance 
~ 
Separation 
Separation 
Recovery with earth 
landing system 
Effects induced by 
environment 
Objectives 
Demonstrate satisfactory power-on stability for  abort  in the 
maximum -dynamic -pressure region with conditions that 
approximate emergency detection subsystem l imits  
Demonstrate satisfactory canard deployment, turnaround dynam 
ics, and main-heat-shield-forward flight stability before LES 
jettison 
b 
b 
Demonstrate the structural  performance with the canard 
C subsystem 
Demonstrate the structural performance of the boost protective 
cover during an  abort in the maximum-dynamic-pressure 
region 
C 
Demonstrate satisfactory separation of the LES and boost pro-  
b tective cover from the CM 
Demonstrate satisfactory vehicle separation from the SM at a 
selected angle of attack' 
Demonstrate satisfactory operation and performance of the eartl 
b landing system by the use of reefed dual drogues 
~~~~ ~- 
Determine the CM pressure loads, including possible plume 
b 
impingement, in the maximum -dynamic -pressure region 
the launch phase' 
Determine the aerodynamic pressure  loads on the SM during the 
Obtain thermal effects data on the CM during an  abort  in the 
maximum -dynamic -pressure regionL 
bSecond -or der test objective . 
'Third-order test objective. 
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TABLE 11. - LITTLE JOE II FLIGHT PROGRAM OWECTIVES - Continued 
(d) Apollo A-003 mission high-altitude abort  
LES issues  
Abort capability 
Stability 
Structural integrity 
and performance 
Separation 
Recovery with ear th  
landing system 
Effects induced by 
environment 
Demonstrate satisfactory performance of the LEV at an  altitude 
of approximately the upper limit for the canard subsystem a 
Demonstrate orientation of the LEV to a main-heat-shield- 
forward attitudea 
Determine the damping of oscillations in the LEV with the canard 
b subsy s tem deployed 
Determine the physical behavior of the boost protective cover 
C during launch and during entry from high altitude 
~~~ ~ ~~ 
Demonstrate jettison of the LES with the boost protective cover 
b after high -altitude entry 
Demonstrate performance of the system by the use of the two- 
C point harness  attachment for the main parachutes 
3btain data on thermal  effects during boost and during impinge- 
ment of the launch-escape motor plumes on the CM and the 
launch-escape tower 
launch and high-altitude abort' 
C 
Determine pressures  on the CM boost protective cover during 
Determine vibration and acoustic environment and response of 
C 
the SM reaction control system with simulated quads 
a First-order test objective. 
bSecond-order test  objective. 
Third-order test  objective. C 
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TABLE II. - LITTLE JOE I1 FLIGHT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES - Concluded 
(e) Apollo A-004 mission abort in the power-on tumbling boundary region 
LES issues 
4bort capability 
Stability 
Structural integrity 
and performance 
Separation 
Recovery with earth 
Effects induced by 
environment 
Objectives 
~ ~~ ~~ 
Demonstrate satisfactory performance of the LEV for an abort 
a in the power-on tumbling boundary region 
Demonstrate the capability of the canard subsystem to satisfac- 
torily reorient and stabilize the heat shield of the vehicle in 
a forward attitude after a power -on tumbling abort b 
Demonstrate the structural integrity of the airframe structure 
a for an abort in the power-on tumbling boundary region 
Demonstrate the structural capability of the production space - 
b craft to withstand the launch environment 
Demonstrate the capability of the CM forward-heat-shield 
thrusters to satisfactorily separate the forward heat shield 
after the tower has been jettisoned by the tower-jettison motoi 
Demonstrate satisfactory separation of the LEV from SMC 
~ ~~ ~~ 
Demonstrate satisfactory operation and performance of the sys - 
tem with a production spacecraft' 
Determine the static loads on the CM during launch and during 
b the abort sequence 
b Determine the dynamic loading on the CM inner structure 
Determine the dynamic loads and the structural response of the 
b SM during launch 
stream conditions and by LES motor plumes during a power- 
on tumbling abort 
of operation of the earth landing system' 
Determine the static pressures imposed on the CM by free- 
b 
Obtain data on the structural response of the CM during sequence 
Obtain thermal data on the boost protective cover during a 
C power -on tumbling abort 
C 
Obtain acoustical noise data inside the CM at an astronaut station 
a First-order test objective. 
bSecond-order test objective. 
Third-order test objective. C 
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Time lrom lift-off 
M a p r  events sec 
1. Lift-off 0 
2 .  Thrust termination and a k r t  28.5 
3.  LES motor burnout and coast - -  
4. Tower and forward-heat-shleld 
separatmn 44.0 
5. Drogue-parachute deployment 48.0 
6. Pilot-parachute deployment 116.0 
7. Main parachute full inl lat ion 121.0 
8. CM landing 350.3 
Figure 6 .  - Major events of Apollo A-001 
mission. 
0 b k 12 16 20 2 4 x  10’ 4 w2 v‘/ 
Range It 
Event rec 
Time from l i l t  011 
I L l l l O f l  0 
1 Canard deployment 37 3 
4 Tower jettison 0 0 4  
5 Apex cover leltison 0 0 8  
6 orogue parachute deployment 47 5 
7 Pilot pardchule deployment 84 P 
t Main patdchuter f u l l  open 106 0 
9 CM landing w7 8 
1 Abort initiation 26 3 
Figure 8. - Major events of Apollo A-003 
mission. 
i 
1. Launch 
2. P l tch-up 
3 .  Abort 
4.  Coast 
5 .  Deploy canards and 
6. Jettison tower 
1 .  Deploy drogue 
parachute 
8. Deploy pilot 
parachutes 
9. In f la te  main 
parachutes 
IO. Landing 01 CM 
lurn around 
& 
7 M 
8 Y 
b 
Figure 7 .  - Major events of Apollo A-002 
mission. 
Range, It 
Time lrom lilt-of1 
Event sec 
1. Lilt-offI81700.776a.m. m.r.t.1 36.4 
3 Mach 1.0 41.8 
4.  Maxq 70 81 
5 Pitch-up initiation 70.81 
2 Staging 38.7 
6 Abort initiation 73.7 
7. Canard deployment 84.8 
8 Tower jettison 193.8 
9 .  Drogue-parachute deployment 195 8 
IO. Main-parachute deployment 237.6 
11. Main-parachute disconnect 410 0 
12. CM landinq 410 0 
-Figure 9. - Major events of Apollo A-004 
mission. 
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SATURN AND APOLLO UNMANNED 
FLI GHT-TEST PROGRAM 
The Saturn flight-test program was 
conducted on the boilerplate Apollo space- 
craft, production-type launch escape sys-  
tems,  and Saturn I launch vehicles (fig. 10). 
This program was designed to  show the 
compatibility of the Apollo spacecraft sys- 
tem with the Saturn-type launch vehicle. 
The Saturn flight-test program involved two 
unmanned missions . 
In the first test (AS-101), depicted in 
figure 11, the normal tower-jettison mode 
was successfully demonstrated. The 
launch-escape and pitch-control motors 
were inert. In the second test (AS-102), 
depicted in figure 12, the backup mode of 
tower jettison using the launch-escape and 
pitch-control motors was successfully 
demonstrated. There were four unmanned 
Apollo missions, all of which involved a 
qualification configuration of the launch 
escape system, and all of these flights 
used a normal tower-jettison mode. 
120 r 
Event 
1. Saturn 5-1 lift-off 
2. Saturn 5-1 engine shutdown 
Inboard engines 
Outboard engines 
3. Separation 
20 5 .  LES tower jettison 
6. Saturn S - E  shutdown 
.- 
& a  
._ 
4 
Time from lift-off, 
sec 
Planned Actual 
0 0 
14l.1 142.8 
146.5 149.2 
148.2 150.2 
158.5 161.2 
625.8 624.5 
146.1 148.8 
1 
0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 1 m  
I I 1 I I 0 
Range, n .  mi. 
Figure 11. - Major events of Apollo 
AS-101 mission. 
LES (diameter - 26 in . )  
in .  
761 
Figure 10. - Apollo BP-13. 
in 
2 Saturn 5-1 shutdown 
Inboard engines 
Outbard engines 
4. Saturn S-Lp ignition 
6. Saturn S - U !  shutdown 
0 2 0 0 4 a ) K m 8 a  
Range n .  mi 
a 0 0  
b 
140.9 141.3 
146.9 147.4 
c 147.1 148.2 
d 149.4 149.9 
e 159.7 160.2 
619.3 621.1 f 
Figure 12. - Major events of Apollo 
AS-102 mission. 
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MANNED-FLI GHT PROGRAM 
Through the lunar-landing mission, five manned missions involved qualification 
configurations. There were no aborts that required the use of the LES. During each 
of these missions, the tower-jettison motors were used, and the performance was 
nominal. 
RESULTS 
A summary of Apollo LES qualification flights is given in table 111. The capabil- 
ity of the Apollo LES to jettison under nominal launch conditions was  verified during 
the Apollo AS-101 and AS-102 missions. The remaining six Apollo spacecraft abort 
TABLE 111. - APOLLO LES QUALIFICATION FLIGHTS 
Mission 
de signation 
PA-1 
A- 001 
AS-101 
AS- 102 
A- 002 
A- 003 
PA-  2 
A- 004 
Spacecraft 
BP- 6 
BP-12 
BP-13 
BP-15 
BP-23 
BP- 22 
BP- 2 3A 
sc- 002 
Description 
First pad abort 
Transonic abort 
Nominal launch and 
exit environment 
Nominal launch and 
exit environment 
Maximum- dynamic- 
p re s su re  abort  
Low-altitude abort  
(planned high- 
altitude abort) 
Second pad abort 
Power-on tumbling 
boundary abort  
Launch date 
November 7, 1963 
May 13, 1964 
May 28, 1964 
September 18, 1964 
December 8, 1964 
May19, 1965 
June 29, 1965 
January 20, 1966 
~~ 
Launch site 
(a) 
WSMR 
WSMR 
KSC 
KSC 
WSMR 
WSMR 
WSMR 
WSMR 
%SMR (White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico); KSC (John F. Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida). 
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test flights were conducted t o  examine the performance of.the Apollo spacecraft and the 
LES under conditions that were not expected during normal manned missions. The 
abort points fo r  Saturn launch-vehicle flights are shown in figure 13 with the resul ts  
of the abort-type flight tests. 
Flight data for the Apollo A-004 mission are typical of the details that were con- 
sidered in the flight-test program. The Apollo A-004 mission test  point was located 
within the region of the power-on tumbling boundary. The boundary position was  based 
on the structural-load capability of the Apollo spacecraft and on the altitude and veloc- 
ity at which the launch escape vehicle could be allowed to tumble during the power-on 
phase of the abort without undergoing greater-than-design-limit loads. The determina- 
tion of structural  loading was based on the local pressure differential ac ross  the CM 
exterior wall. The pressure differential was caused by the difference between the in- 
ternal cavity pressure and the combined external effects of the aerodynamic pressure 
and plume impingement of the launch-escape motor. The Apollo spacecraft design- 
limit load fo r  this condition was 11.1 psid. 
An expanded view of the Apollo A-004 mission test region is shown, in figure 14. 
The test region is bounded by the predicted Little Joe I1 launch-vehicle maximum- and 
minimum-performance trajectories and by an allowable pressure dispersion of 
*1.5 psid. With nominal performance of the LEV, a differential pressure of approxi- 
mately 11.8 psid was predicted during the actual abort of the Apollo A-004 mission. 
The plume-impingement pressure data that were used in the mission design were ap- 
proximated from data taken in wind-tunnel tests. The approximation was based on the 
assumption that the impingement p re s su res  were a direct  function of f ree-s t ream 
dynamic pressure and the relationship between plume and free-stream momentum. 
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Figure 14. - Test region and abort 
points for  the Apollo A-004 
mission. 
Figure 13. - Mission-abort points in 
relation to Saturn launch-vehicle 
flight envelope. 
23 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In reviewing the fai lures  that were encountered during the development and quali- 
fication of this subsystem, it can be seen that adequate definition of both system and 
test requirements with proper inspection between tests would have eliminated all fail- 
u re s  except the tower-jettison motor interstage failure.  Even this  failure could 
probably have been avoided with adequate fabrication procedure definition and on-the - 
spot, real-t ime inspection. 
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